With variations derived from the particular circumstances of each case, the same story has been repeated over time and in different places. When a country is affected by an event that disrupts the functioning of its institutions, and lacks effective social and political mechanisms that make it return to previously existing conditions, it is possible that its internal cohesion cracks, giving way to a process of fragmentation. that no one fully controls.
Obviously, this is not always the case, or the process may be short-lived. But sometimes, if the situation is right, the unleashed centrifugal factions can consolidate, causing a state of affairs that gradually becomes the new normal.
Processes of this kind have taken place, for example, in Somalia, after Siad Barre’s long tenure in government, in Lebanon due to the civil war and hostilities with Israel, in Libya after the fall of Gaddafi, and in Colombia as a result of the Bogotazo. Now it’s happening in Haiti.
The vacuum generated by institutional disintegration does not last forever. It tends to be quickly occupied by those who have the means to do so. And usually those means do not consist of thoughtful government proposals, persuasive speeches or rehabilitation programs. Under these conditions, the most effective means often involve weapons and other instruments of force.
The economy enters the scene when those involved begin to develop profitable activities. Initially as a form of sustenance, these activities are gaining space at the expense of any political, ideological or claim consideration that might have been present. The original causes are gradually lost sight of and the factions are transformed into militias with their own income-generating structure. At that point, the Economic interests They work for their permanence.
