On February 20, the president of the United States, Donald Trump, signed a executive order entitled “Ending Certain Tariff Actions” ending additional tariffs imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) on a long list of countries, including the tariff threat against oil suppliers to Cuba. The order, of global scope, reverses measures that affected Mexico, Canada, China, Brazil, Russia, Iran and Cuba, among others.
The immediate question that arises in Havana is direct: does this mean the end of the oil siege that Washington has imposed on the island since the end of January? The answer, with nuances, is no.
What the order of February 20 says—and what it doesn’t say—
The White House text is precise in what it eliminates and careful in what it preserves. The order explicitly repeals tariffs ad valorem additional taxes imposed under IEEPA, including those contained in the Executive Order 14380 of January 29, 2026which threatened to tax imports from countries that supplied oil, directly or indirectly, to Cuba.
However, the document is unambiguous on two key points. First, the national emergency declared over Cuba remains intact: “Declared or described national emergencies (…) remain in effect and will not be affected by this order.” Second, any other actions taken in response to those emergencies—not involving the imposition of tariffs under IEEPA—are also unaffected.
In other words: tariffs as a specific tool disappear; the legal architecture and other pressure measures, no.
The national emergency over Cuba is not new, but dates back to 1996. It was originally declared by Bill Clinton on March 1, 1996, after the downing of two small planes belonging to the “Brothers to the Rescue” organization. Since then, all presidents (Clinton, Bush, Obama, Biden and Trump) have renewed it every year without interruption.
A month of oil blockade with real consequences
Trump raised the bar by declaring on January 29, 2026 that Cuba represents a “unusual and extraordinary threat” for US national security and foreign policy.
The measure established a system of secondary tariffs to punish any nation that maintained oil trade with the island. The declaration came at a time of extreme energy vulnerability for Cuba: weeks earlier, on January 3, a US military operation in Caracas culminated in the capture of then-Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, which defined the sudden suspension of the flow of Venezuelan crude oil to the island.
The threat of tariffs worked as an immediate deterrent. According to a comprehensive analysis published by The New York Times On February 20 and reproduced by multiple media, oil tanker traffic to Cuba practically stopped.
Mexico, which By 2025 it had supplied 44% of the oil imported by Cubaofficially suspended its deliveries on January 27, pressured by the negotiations of the United States, Mexico and Canada Agreement (USMCA) and dependence on the US market.
President Claudia Sheinbaum has tried to walk a fine line, sending humanitarian aid.
The US Coast Guard intercepted the tanker on February 9 Ocean Mariner, that transported more than 84 thousand barrels of fuel oil Colombian bound for Havanain a sign that the oil blockade has not been just rhetoric. The pressure reaches shipping companies, insurers, financial intermediaries and ports.
The humanitarian impact: hospitals, MSMEs and 20-hour blackouts
The consequences on the Cuban population have been immediate and documented. The Minister of Public Health, José Ángel Portal Miranda, warned on February 23 that the energy deficit is already affecting the ambulance service, causing blackouts in hospitals and has forced the suspension of flights with medical supplies. “It is not rhetoric to say that this situation can put lives at risk,” the minister stressed.
The impact on the private sector is not minor. A study by the private consulting firm Auge, published on February 21revealed that 96% of Cuban micro, small and medium-sized companies are on the verge of collapse. With blackouts of up to 20 hours a day and fuel prices on the black market that exceed 6 dollars per liter—more than 3 or 4 thousand pesos—the private business community faces its biggest crisis since the opening of 2010.
Three UN experts and rapporteurs sentenced on February 13 the threat of tariffs, calling it a unilateral act that violates the principles of sovereign equality and free trade, and warned that the blocking measures “may end up constituting collective punishment for civilians.” The rapporteurs also recalled that the executive order of January 29 lacks authorization from the UN Security Council.
What tools does Trump have left to prevent the arrival of an oil tanker to Cuba?
The elimination of tariffs under IEEPA does not imply that Washington does not have alternative instruments to pursue this policy, and recent history suggests that it is willing to use them.
Naval surveillance. The US Coast Guard and Navy maintain a significant military presence in the Caribbean, the largest in decades according to the Times. The interception of Ocean Mariner demonstrated that the capacity for physical blockade exists and is exercised independently of tariffs. Bloomberg reported on February 20 that a tanker carrying Russian fuel—the seahorsewith nearly 200 thousand barrels of diesel—was heading towards Havana, putting precisely that naval encirclement to the test.
Financial sanctions and the Helms-Burton Act. The trade embargo/blockade on Cuba, codified since 1996 in the Freedom Law (Helms-Burton), remains intact. This law allows sanctioning companies and individuals that “traffic” with confiscated properties in Cuba and has extraterritorial scope. Shipping companies, insurers and banks that facilitate oil cargoes remain exposed to sanctions from the Treasury Department (OFAC) regardless of tariffs.
Sections 232 and 301 of Commerce. The Trump administration could apply the tariffs under sections 232 (national security) or 301 (unfair trade practices) of the US Trade Act, legal bases historically validated by the courts.
Bilateral diplomatic pressure. Washington has proven effective in convincing trading partners—Mexico is the clearest example—that the cost of supplying oil to Cuba outweighs the benefit. This pressure does not depend on any specific tariff instrument: it is pure geopolitics, and the new executive order does not eliminate it.
The broader strategy
Behind the oil blockade there is a more ambitious strategy that combines energy asphyxiation, international financial pressure and discreet contacts with sectors of the system and the Cuban opposition, with the aim of promoting the fall of the government and a transition.
The Cuban Government He reaffirmed this Monday his decision to resist American pressure, but declared himself open to “respectful” dialogue. Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla denounced before the UN Human Rights Council the “collective punishment” that the energy fence entails. Trump, for his part, has stated on several occasions that there are negotiations with island authorities; Havana describes them as mere “technical exchanges on specific matters.”
The suspension of tariffs is not the end of the energy siege on Cuba. It means, rather, a tactical reconfiguration—derived from the Supreme Court’s decision regarding tariffs— which leaves the pillars of the blockade intact: the naval presence, the historic embargo, financial sanctions and diplomatic pressure.
For Cuba, relief seems unlikely. The island needs around 100,000 barrels a day of crude oil and derivatives, and its national production covers only 40% with sulfurous oil that is mainly used for electricity generation in the deteriorated thermoelectric plants on the island.
The energy “zero hour” that several analysts project for the first weeks of March has not moved away with the signing of February 20.
