This question is not new, but it takes on renewed urgency at a time when the boundaries of intervention are dangerously blurring.
Why does the United States import its Wars into foreign territories?
The US security strategy operates from a disturbing geopolitical premise: any threat to its security – real or perceived – justifies actions beyond its borders. The War on Drugs, started decades ago, mutated into a philosophy of territorial control that transcends mutual cooperation to become imposition. Mexico, due to its geographical proximity and being a transit territory, became a laboratory for experimenting with these policies.
The phenomenon is simple to understand: when a power defines security primarily from its internal interests, it inevitably exports that definition. Mexican drug cartels are, for Washington, American threats. Therefore, actions against them are justified not as exercised Mexican sovereignty, but as US defense in foreign territory.
This logic completely reverses responsibility: Mexico must act according to priorities that Washington establishes, not according to its own comprehensive public security needs.
From institutional strengthening to empty operativism
Years ago, USAID funded programs that seemed tedious but fundamental: training local police, strengthening public ministries, building criminal justice systems. They were slow, gradual investments that responded to the simple logic that sustainable security requires solid institutions. But those programs had a problem for Washington: They didn’t generate spectacular victories or “successful operation” headlines.
Operations against high-impact targets—dramatic arrests, history-making extraditions—produce narratives of immediate success.
The Justice Department may announce an arrest. The media celebrates. American politicians declare victory. Meanwhile, Mexican judicial systems remain weakened, local governments without tools, and communities abandoned to their fate.
The cost of this prioritization is incalculable: a more vulnerable Mexico because it depends on external operations instead of its own capabilities.
Should Mexico fear punishment for disobedience?
The question reveals the true nature of this relationship: one where subordination is an implicit condition of cooperation. When Mexico negotiates extradition treaties, security agreements or access to financing for public security, it does so under the tacit shadow of retaliation.
It is not an explicit threat. It’s worse: it’s the shared understanding that resistance has costs.
Mexican governments face a cruel paradox: acceding to US demands erodes local legitimacy and sovereignty, but resisting generates diplomatic pressures, trade restrictions and cooperation blocks.
In this dilemma, Mexico has tended to give in, normalizing interference as the price of cooperation. But this silent acceptance is exactly what Washington requires: not military occupation, but consensual subordination.
The Insufficiency of International Law against hegemonic powers
When the United States orchestrates operations that result in the capture of figures like Ismael Zambada without direct involvement of Mexican authorities, or when it supports accusations against rulers who challenge its agenda such as Nicolás Maduro, international law exhibits its fundamental weakness. Conventions, treaties, and multilateral frameworks are a dead letter in the face of the political will of powers with veto power in global instances.
International law was built by victors of world wars. He mainly protects those who can make him respect. For nations like Mexico, international agreements work like chains: they bind us to obligations that Washington can ignore when it suits it, but that we cannot fail to comply with without consequences. This asymmetry is not accidental. It is structural.
Realistic limits to hegemonic security
Mexico and Latin America need to clearly establish thresholds that cannot be crossed.
First: operations in national territory only under Mexican judicial mandate and leadership of local authorities, without exceptions.
Second: Security financing should prioritize institutional strengthening over operations.
Third: reversal of extraditions to trial in Mexican territory with guarantees of international due process.
