The expansion of crime is no longer measured in hectares cultivated or tons seized, but in portions of lost sovereignty. In municipalities where the State is weak or non-existent, criminal groups not only rule: they administer. They collect taxes, offer security, dictate rules and regulate markets. Organized crime has become, in functional terms, a government enterprise.
Criminal expansion factors
The growth of these criminal corporations responds to a series of structural failures of the State.
– The first is institutional weakness. 65% of municipal police forces do not meet the minimum standards of operation or trust control (Executive Secretariat of the National Public Security System, 2025). The absence of local capabilities has allowed criminal organizations to become the de facto administrators of security.
– The second is the fiscal crisis of the municipalities. With reduced budgets and high dependence on federal transfers, local governments lack incentives and tools to resist criminal capture. The 2026 Expenditure Budget cut funds for municipal security strengthening by 4.8%, once again prioritizing military spending and the National Guard. This is a model focused on reaction, not institutional construction.
– The third factor is the informal economy and structural inequality. In many regions, criminal organizations function as substitutes for the social state: they generate jobs, distribute resources, grant loans or resolve conflicts. Its legitimacy comes from the efficiency and proximity that the State has abandoned.
Criminal governance in municipalities
Criminal governance manifests itself at different levels. In some territories, the criminal group is a regulatory actor that imposes order without political visibility; in others, it has completely captured the government structure. Documented cases in Michoacán, Jalisco and Zacatecas show how cartels decide who can be a candidate, control public tenders and establish quotas on public works.
CIDE (2024) identifies a pattern of “co-administered governments” where criminal groups participate in local management through political or business intermediaries. This symbiosis erodes the very concept of authority. When the citizen pays twice—to the State and to crime—the social contract is broken and a hybrid form of legality emerges.
The result is a progressive institutional capture: the police become subordinate, the mayors negotiate, the judges give in. The municipality becomes a cell for the financial and social operation of organized crime. It is not just about violence: it is a process of replacing the State with a functional criminal structure.
Financial intelligence vs reactive deployment
The dominant paradigm of combating crime remains anchored in military deployment and the logic of confrontation. However, criminal enterprises operate with economic rationality, not just violence. Financial intelligence is the weakest flank of the national strategy: less than 10% of organized crime investigations have asset or money laundering monitoring (UIF, 2024).
While the authorities pursue hitmen, the organizations control bank accounts, agricultural cooperatives and front companies. They have learned to launder money through legal mechanisms, including in federal or municipal support programs. Without an inter-institutional financial traceability system, any operational hit is only cosmetic.
Mexico requires an intelligent security model, supported by data, financial analysis and cooperation between prosecutors, treasury and intelligence units. Crime is not fought with more weapons, but with greater information and strategic precision.
