Among the many tactical and strategic errors, three stand out.
The first is the low quality of the candidates. Morena thinks that she can put whoever she is and win the election. Thus, the party lists have been filled with unpresentables or people who do not connect with the electorate beyond militancy. Worse yet, sometimes they do not even connect with the militancy itself, since they are assigned in concert with alliance parties or with the PRI.
This has led to internal ruptures similar to those observed in the 1980s among the PRI leadership. Currents within Morena that today call for a structural change within the party, but tomorrow may call for voting for another candidate or for abstentionism. Nothing ensures a cohesive Morena party by 2024.
Morena’s second mistake is austerity. It would be assumed that “republican austerity”, understood as the reduction of excessive government spending, would succeed in freeing up resources to increase social transfers. In reality, austerity has been taken to the extreme, disappearing resources and programs that voters valued, eliminating public jobs and limiting subsidies that supported sectors related to the left such as culture and public universities.
Furthermore, austerity has made many of the public policies of the federal government not work. In order to save money, the government has implemented policies with fewer personnel than required, has lost talented cadres and has granted public works to people without experience.
It is true that you cannot have a rich government with a poor people. But it is also true that you cannot have a rich people with a cheap government. Cheap is expensive.
Finally, there is the relationship with the media. Morena has miscalculated her relationship with the press, intellectuals and anyone who influences public opinion. Instead of having a rapprochement with the press, she has alienated it; instead of sheltering “influencers”, she has banished them. But still, in her morning conference she gives more ratings to “conservative intellectuals” (sic) than to anyone who has a position related to her movement.
Morena has taken the popularity of the president as the only valid metric of her actions. This is a resounding mistake. Nothing indicates that the president’s popularity translates immediately into votes. Zedillo had a 66% popularity rating when he began the 2000 election campaign and lost. Calderón had 59% and also lost. Today, López Obrador has 58% .
