When thinking about political ideologies, the most common resource is to classify candidates and voters into leftists and rightists. The axis of this classification is usually the economic model. Rightists believe in market economics, while leftists favor greater state intervention.
Over the years, the borders between both concepts have become blurred. The Chinese Communist Party introduced market reforms that have allowed its country spectacular economic growth. On the other hand, the president of the United States, Donald Trump, has been developing a protectionist policy that goes against one of the principles of the market economy, free trade.
In Peru, the acid test is to ask about Title III of the 1993 Constitution, on the economic regime, which covers issues such as private initiative, the role of the State, freedom of enterprise, competition, investment and the monetary regime. Center and right-wing politicians defend this title, which has allowed per capita income to multiply almost threefold in real terms and poverty to be reduced by a third since its promulgation. Left-wing politicians continue to think that it is necessary to change the economic model and, the most radical ones, through a constituent assembly.
The problem comes when trying to apply the concepts of left and right to classify voters. According to an Ipsos Peru survey, only 37% of Peruvians know the terms left and right in politics. 55% admit not understanding these concepts. And, as expected, knowledge varies according to educational level and socioeconomic level (SES). This ranges from 74% in SES A to 23% in SES E (see plate 1).
This lack of knowledge is not new, nor is the distribution of the informed electorate on the political spectrum. The vast majority are located in positions close to the center (see plate 2). Therefore, it is not true that the electorate has become polarized. The majority do not have extreme opinions or are simply far from politics. Polarization occurs only in a minority addicted to political discussion.
In reality, voters are not distributed along a continuum between left and right, but are differentiated along at least three axes: economic, political and social. The economic ranges from the supporters of the free market to the most statist. The politician, from the most democratic to the supporters of an authoritarian leader. And the social, from the most liberal to the most conservative in terms of interpersonal relationships.
In 2020, Ipsos Peru designed the “Test of Political, Economic and Social Orientations” (TOPES) with 12 questions with antonym expressions and 10-point scales for the book Elections and Deceptions(1). Recently, the test was applied again on behalf of Perú21Foro and the results are revealing.
The greatest difference is found in the political axis, where the number of citizens who could be classified as authoritarian or semi-authoritarian has increased from 29% to 38% to the detriment of semi-democrats or democrats, who have decreased from 71% to 62%. (see plate 3). The change is the natural consequence of the advance of organized crime and the deterioration of the figure of the head of state that the country suffered during the administrations of Castillo and Boluarte.
On the economic axis, the distribution of 2025 is not very different from that of 2020. Supporters of the free market make up 62%, while supporters of state interventionism make up 38%, although another way of looking at it would be to say that supporters of intermediate positions (semi-free market + semi-interventionists) make up 65%, while openly liberal and statist positions are a minority (see plate 4).
In the social axis, the conservative trend, which was already the majority in 2020, has accentuated in 2025. (see plate 5). It should be noted that, unlike other societies in which the left is progressive, in Peru the majority of supporters of state intervention in the economy are socially conservative, especially in the Andean electorate.
If we omit the social axis, the electorate can be divided into five large segments (see plate 6): the pro-market democrats (21%), the pro-market authoritarians (7%), the authoritarian interventionists (14%), the democratic interventionists (8%) and, the largest segment, those located in positions in the center of the two axes (50%).
As is known, the vote is not merely ideological. Frequently, identity or emotional factors weigh more in the electoral decision. A populist leader can navigate at will between semi-democratic and semi-authoritarian positions, pro-market on some issues and interventionist on others. Unfortunately, deception is a frequent weapon in politics, especially when many candidates disguise their desire to get rich through corruption or associated with illegal economies with ideological or identity positions. A big task for the press in the upcoming elections will be to unmask these false preachers.
(1) Torres, Alfredo (2020). Choices and disappointments. History of a democracy under construction. Planeta Editorial.
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