The normalization of the intolerable
Manzo’s death is part of a macabre sequence that includes the murders of Homero Gómez, defender of the monarch butterfly; Bernardo Bravo, leader of a lemon sector in Apatzingán; and an increasingly extensive list of mayors executed during the administration of Alfredo Ramírez Bedolla.
This accumulation of homicides is not accidental nor does it reflect isolated episodes of violence: it evidences a systematic pattern of institutional collapse where criminal organizations dispute territories, routes and resources more effectively than the government itself.
The most worrying thing is not only the frequency of these crimes, but the progressive social and political normalization that accompanies them. Each murder generates a predictable cycle: rhetorical condemnation, promises of investigation, announcements of renewed strategies and, finally, impunity. The repetition of this pattern has eroded citizen trust and has sent an unmistakable message to criminal groups: the cost of assassinating authorities is practically zero.
Media strategies versus real results
The case of Carlos Manzo illustrates another recurring problem in Michoacan security management: the replacement of effective strategies with political communication exercises. Manzo built a public narrative based on media hits and forceful statements, but Uruapan did not experience tangible improvements in its security indicators. This approach, focused on the projection of authority rather than its effective exercise, reflects a superficial understanding of the criminal phenomenon.
Uruapan’s previous experience with the Federal Police as a municipal surveillance force constitutes a revealing precedent. Despite the presence of federal elements, the city continued to be the scene of violence and systematic extortion. This intervention failed because it responded to a political logic of “showing presence” without attacking the structural causes: institutional infiltration, corruption of local corporations, the lack of operational criminal intelligence and the absence of effective coordination between levels of government.
The paradox of differentiated action
A central question remains without a satisfactory answer: why does the federal government deploy qualitatively different strategies in Michoacán compared to other states affected by violence?
While coordinated operations with documentable results are implemented in the State of Mexico, Michoacán seems to operate under a logic of containment rather than confrontation. This differentiation suggests complex political calculations that include possible tacit agreements, organizational capacity of criminal groups to generate unmanageable crises, or simply the perception that Michoacán is a lost territory.
The consolidation of cartels in the region, particularly the Jalisco Nueva Generación Cartel and Los Viagras, has created deeply rooted criminal economies in sectors such as avocado, illegal mining, and synthetic drug trafficking. These organizations not only exercise violence: they administer territories, collect parallel taxes and offer “security” services that the State does not provide. Dismantling these structures requires sustained political will, considerable resources and, above all, breaking with the logic of administration of violence that has prevailed.
Structural causes and vicious circles
The Michoacan crisis is not explained solely by the strength of the cartels, but by the institutional weakness accumulated over decades. The capture of municipal governments by organized crime, citizen distrust towards infiltrated police corporations, the precariousness of local justice systems and political fragmentation have created an ecosystem where violence is reproduced organically.
Furthermore, the criminal economy has been integrated into legal dynamics in a way that makes it difficult to separate them. The avocado sector, for example, faces systematic extortion, but it also generates financial flows that criminal groups launder and reinvest. This symbiosis between legal and illegal economy complicates any strategy that does not consider viable economic alternatives for communities trapped in these dynamics.
