This absence not only generates regulatory asymmetries within the bloc, it also opens spaces where investments linked to rival governments, commercial triangulation schemes or capital flows that end up strengthening strategic interests outside of North America can filter through.
David Gantz, a researcher at the Mexico Center at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, made the point clearly. Mexico, he maintained, requires a mechanism equivalent to the United States Foreign Investment Committee, known as CFIUS, to evaluate foreign investments, particularly those of Chinese origin, although not exclusively.
The risk, he warned, goes beyond financial capital. It includes the possibility of companies using Mexican territory as a platform for transshipping Chinese goods to the United States, in sensitive sectors such as steel, connected vehicles, medical equipment or maritime transportation. Faced with this scenario, he proposed two possible routes. A national scheme of its own or a model coordinated with the United States and Canada.
In recent years, the United States has kept a close eye on China’s investments in Mexico. According to updated figures from the Ministry of Economy, in 2024 investment from the Asian country reached a historical maximum of 916 million dollars.
In fact, there are already efforts to strengthen the control of foreign investment in Mexico. On December 7, 2023, former United States Secretary of the Treasury, Janet Yellen, and the then Secretary of the Treasury and Public Credit, Rogelio Ramírez de la O, signed a Memorandum of Intent that underlines the relevance of investment control as a tool to protect national security.
The mechanisms of the US and Canada
In the United States, that filter has existed for decades. CFIUS operates as an interagency body coordinated by the Department of the Treasury and made up of key agencies such as Defense, Commerce, Homeland Security, State and Energy. Its function is to review acquisitions, mergers or participations of foreign capital in US companies when the operation involves sensitive sectors, critical infrastructure, strategic technologies or large volumes of personal data.
The process can begin by voluntary decision of the companies or be activated compulsorily in certain cases, which allows the government to evaluate risks before closing the transaction.
When the committee identifies potential threats, it can impose conditions to mitigate risks, require adjustments to the investment structure or recommend to the president of the United States that he block or reverse the operation. Its scope was substantially expanded in 2018 with the approval of the FIRRMA law, which extended supervision to minority investments and emerging technologies.
This strengthening turned the CFIUS into an international reference and explains why Washington pressures its trading partners to have equivalent mechanisms that avoid regulatory gaps within increasingly integrated production chains.
Canada has a similar scheme. The review of foreign investments is governed by the Investment Canada Actwhich allows the government to evaluate operations under two central criteria. The first is the net benefit, which analyzes whether the investment provides economic advantages to the country, such as employment, production or innovation.
The second is national security, which is activated when an operation may affect sensitive sectors. The process is coordinated by the Ministry of Innovation, Science and Industry, with the participation of security and intelligence agencies.
In recent years, Canada has tightened that framework to align it with its allies, especially the United States. The government can impose conditions, block investments or even order disinvestment when it identifies risks, especially in operations linked to capital from countries considered high strategic risk, such as China. This regulatory convergence left Mexico as the exception within the bloc.
A trilateral scan
Diego Marroquín Bitar, researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, was even more categorical. Mexico lacks a formal mechanism for investment screening and that divergent approach exposes the United States to security risks and regulatory gaps. To correct this, he proposed moving towards a North American economic security committee that would allow for coordinating decisions, sharing information and closing gaps between partners. In his reading, the institutional weakness of one ends up affecting the entire block.
Sarah Stewart, executive director of the Silverado Policy Accelerator, expanded on the discussion. For her, the problem is not limited to the absence of a formal committee. It also reflects the lack of capabilities to track who invests, with what ownership structure and with what strategic objectives. Stewart proposed greater exchange of information between partners, transparency about final beneficiaries and regional coordination to close spaces of vulnerability, particularly in critical minerals and semiconductors, where China maintains a dominant position.
Emily Kilcrease, senior fellow and director of the Energy, Economics and Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, put the debate into a broader perspective. The review of the T-MEC, he stated, should serve to align North America’s economic security policies vis-à-vis China.
That includes export controls, reliable technology import programs and foreign investment review mechanisms in each country. Without solid safeguards, he warned, Mexico’s growing integration into chains linked to artificial intelligence infrastructure increases the risk of diversion of sensitive technologies.
The review of the T-MEC will not only revolve around traditional trade. The security of investments is emerging as one of the most delicate axes of the negotiation. Mexico, converted into a key platform for nearshoring and as a priority trading partner of the United States, it faces the challenge of strengthening its institutional architecture.
