The confirmation of the abusive use of the Pegasus spyware by the NSO Group, of Israeli origin, on the cell phones of journalists and human rights defenders in El Salvador, confirms a “new threat” for the journalistic union, and for anyone in general, warns the researcher for Central America of Amnesty International, Astrid Valencia, who suggests that a “moratorium” be established for this software – for exclusive sale to Governments – not to be distributed or used anymore.
In an interview with the program Tonight, the expert pointed out that the use of Pegasus software, in cases of journalists and defenders, is given with the clear intention of “silence the union at any cost”, highlighting that in this context it is urgent “an immediate moratorium for the use, transfer, and sale of this type of program, which has been proven to have been used abusively.
Amnesty International, at the beginning of January, indicated that, through its technical experts from the Security Laboratory, they reviewed the report and independently verified the joint investigation by Access Now —an organization that watches over the protection of digital rights— and Citizen Lab —a specialized cybersecurity laboratory at the University of Toronto— confirming the large-scale use of NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware against journalists and members of civil society organizations in El Salvador.
What did Amnesty International’s confirmation work consist of in this case of the use of the Pegasus system for the surveillance of journalists and also of human rights activists in El Salvador?
Basically, there was a joint investigation by the Access Know and Citizen Lab organizations, which precisely verified the large-scale use of this NSO Group Pagasus spyware. What Amnesty International’s security laboratory did, on behalf of its technology department, was to independently analyze this report and have access to forensic evidence that allowed us to verify the abusive use of Pegasus software in the case of activists and journalists. in El Salvador.
What is the seriousness of this type of espionage against journalists and human rights defenders? What consequences could it have?
Without a doubt, the use of Pegasus to monitor communications in El Salvador begins a new threat, a new insult, a new type of harassment that the journalistic union has to face. We have clearly seen, publicly, how officials of the current administration, at the highest level, have discredited journalistic work in the country. There is a lack of space for dialogue, debate, and consensus, and it is in this context that the use of Pegasus to abusively monitor journalists and activists is verified. As for the consequences, this sounds all the alerts and worries that the threats, that the harassment against those who inform the population, or who do human rights work, will increase and become even more serious situations and this will be the beginning of a escalation for silencing freedom of expression and the right to defend rights in the country.
Could it put the physical integrity of these journalists and these activists at risk?
Clear. In this escalation there is a fear that this type of threats and harassment will increase in severity. What we have seen with the Pegasus software, in the cases of journalists and activists, is that they clearly want to silence this union at any cost, and the Pegasus spy program on their phones gave a clear example of the hostile environment that journalists and activists have to face. human rights defenders in El Salvador.
In 2021, the organization Forbidden Stories calculated that at least ten countries used this espionage program, including Mexico, with the particular case of Carmen Aristegui, how likely is it that this program is used by other Central American governments? would you know if it is in use?
Exactly what you mention, different organizations, including Amnesty International, have had a prolonged work around the Pegasus project, where it has been possible to verify the use of this spyware against, in an abusive way, journalists and human rights defenders by that from Amnesty and from other civil society organizations we are clearly asking the states for an immediate moratorium on the use, transfer, sale of this type of program that has been proven to have been used abusively against journalists and people who criticize the government.
Is it possible to detect this program on a device?
Yes, clearly. At Amnesty International we have created a tool kit (set of tools) of mobile verification that is in the network, where people can apply certain steps to determine, have some element that makes them think that their device is taken with this software. There is also a digital security helpline from the Access Now organization, also on their website, where you can also receive some technical assistance in determining if the software is located on your devices.
Astrid in Nicaragua recently received attacks from independent media and bloggers whose WhatsApp accounts have been hijacked. How does Amnesty view these cases given the particular context of state repression against the press and human rights defenders?
Precisely a similar case was also reported recently in El Salvador. In the case of Nicaragua, journalistic work is one that has to overcome a series of threats that range from life to threats and digital harassment, such as the one you mention, so this type of situation does nothing more than verify that the journalistic union in Nicaragua continues to be targeted and that informing the world of what is happening in Nicaragua continues to be a risk for the journalistic profession.
Could we see this type of surveillance against the citizenry?
Anyone who has a mobile phone can be at risk of Pegasus-style spyware, although clearly the profession and profile of the person increases this risk.
Amnesty is currently supporting legal action against NSO Group, who are the creators and the ones who also manage this program, what is it?
It is a legal action filed by members, people close to Amnesty International and also from the human rights community, which is under Israeli jurisdiction, where the call is basic and clear, that they revoke the export license of NSO Group, because we have been able to to see that their spy products have been used in malicious attacks, as I was saying, especially against journalists and human rights activists around the world.
What can the victims of this type of surveillance and espionage do in countries whose authorities are the ones who mainly attack those targets; journalists or human rights defenders, as in the case of El Salvador?
I think that precisely the Salvadoran case brings us a clear example of the importance, one, of the documentation of the facts, that is, what specialized teams, in this type of situation, such as the Amnesty International laboratory, Citizen Lab, Access Now, can document and verify the presence of software on devices. Then, clearly the public denunciation is an essential step to call the attention of the international community, the denunciation before the international human rights mechanisms is also an important step to be able to show the world the abusive and illegal use of this type of software and clearly we continue to reiterate to the states the establishment of this immediate moratorium on the use, the distribution of Pegasus spyware.
