The Botrading Case replaces under the magnifying glass to Bolivian fiscal oil deposits (YPFB) and exposes the fragility of its corporate governance. What should be an efficient mechanism to ensure fuels has become a new front of questions about legality, transparency and efficiency. The complaint of deputy Carlos Alarcón shows in detail how this company constituted in Paraguay, with the majority capital of YPFB refining and minor participation of Logistics YPFB, operates more as a corporate shell than as a real actor in the market. With just three employees and a minimum capital, it would have intermediated millionaire and crude purchases that ended up being reluctant to YPFB itself, a scheme that raises suspicions of simulation and conflict of interest.
The numbers are eloquent. According to the legislative investigation, in several contracts adeles were approved that far exceeded the limit of 10% provided for in the regulations, with an extreme case in contract 366: of an original amount of 31 million dollars, it was passed to more than $ 274 million. Diesel payments loaded to crude contracts and the existence of a “ghost” contract that appears in payment forms but not in the official list were also documented. To this is added the contradiction in tenders: Botrading was awarded even when it offered higher prices than other competitors, which shows that there was no real competition but systematic favor.
YPFB, in his defense, spread a press release in which he celebrates the approval of the Deputies Chamber’s report as a legality test. He states that Botrading has generated more than 56 million dollars in profits that will return to the country and that, unlike traders such as Vitol or Trafigura, those profits do not go abroad. However, the explanation is insufficient.
First, because formal legality does not equal transparency. Second, because audited financial statements that confirm these profits or a clear repatriation schedule have not been published. Third, because the 80 million dollar debt that Botrading contracted with YPFB refining, guaranteed with contracts granted by the state itself, constitutes a conflict of interest that has not been clear.
The underlying problem is not only the corporate structure in Paraguay, but the absence of verifiable information and the opacity in the management of public resources. The state -owned state is limited to general statements and refuses the specific data that could dissipate suspicions: complete lists of contracts, percentages of variation in addendas, award criteria, terms of domestic loans and payment control mechanisms. Without these details, the official discourse is reduced to a self -complacency narrative.
To the lack of clarity is added a more serious fact: YPFB has failed to guarantee stability in fuel supply. Long lines in service stations, emergency imports and permanent uncertainty about the provision of diesel and gasoline contradict the supposed success of botrading. What are hypothetical utilities of if the tangible result is scarcity and distrust?
This case demands answers at the height of the crisis of trust. Citizens deserve certainty and not excuses. While that does not happen, YPFB will continue to feed the suspicion that their businesses are handled in shadows, and the country will continue to suffer the insecurity of an unstable supply.
