The situation in Venezuela has become the determining factor of the Cuban economy in the short term. Relations with the South American country have been key to Cuba’s economic stability, especially in the energy field. So much so that, despite having reduced its historical shipments in recent years, Venezuelan supply remains key.
Despite the terrible blackouts that affect homes and businesses daily and for several hours, Venezuelan oil, added to national production and other external sources of fuel, guarantees until now the minimum vitality of the economy and society.
I recently talked to a friend about this situation, and in a “zero fuel” scenario he told me something real: the last five years will seem like paradise compared to what would await us. This is not the time to be alarmist or predict catastrophes, but the circumstances require extreme pragmatism.
Cuba: internal and external sources of crude oil
Cuba consumes around 120 thousand barrels of oil per day (bpd), as can be calculated from a interview from the Minister of Energy and Mines offered to the newspaper Granma in March 2025. Of them:
- 33% is of national production (40 thousand bpd). After 13 years of decreases in national crude oil production, the state company Cubapetróleo (CUPET) overachieved production last year, which covers a third of the country’s demand.
- 67% comes from imports (80 thousand bpd), which makes Cuba an economy highly dependent on fossil fuels produced in other parts of the world. The main suppliers are Venezuela, Mexico, Russia and, to a lesser extent, Angola, Algeria or Brazil.
In October 2000, Cuba and Venezuela signed a Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement. The island obtained very beneficial conditions to receive 53 thousand bpd in exchange for medical, technical and professional services.
At its peak, between 2009-2012, Venezuela shipped 100,000 barrels of crude oil daily. Starting in 2013, coinciding with the deterioration of the economic situation in the South American country, the supply began to progressively decrease.
In 2025, Venezuela sent between 27,000 and 35,000 bpd to Cuba, according to various sources. Although the decrease is notable, this amount still represents 22-29% of the demand that Cuba’s economy needs to function “normally.” At the end of the year, the US blockade of Venezuelan oil ships interrupted flows to Cuba.
What can happen?
Until now, the Chavista government remains in power, has guaranteed administrative continuity and is showing internal unity, even with massive popular demonstrations. However, it faces undeniable pressure from the United States.
We cannot lose sight of the fact that Venezuela is being threatened by the most powerful power on the planet. As if they were dominoes, the president of the United States has declared his intention to cut off all the “money and oil” coming from Venezuela to bring down Cuba.
At such a critical moment, what scenarios would we have ahead of us?:
- Unlikely scenario: everything returns to “normal.” With the least of all odds, the United States would lift the oil blockade on Venezuela and allow—or turn a blind eye—to shipments to Cuba.
- Probable scenario 1: partial and progressive reductions. Even if the Bolivarian government were willing to maintain its energy commitments to Cuba, it would face persecution and pressure from Washington. That hostility could manifest itself in a combination of more military threats, continued theft of Venezuelan fuel ships, and diplomatic pressure.
- Probable scenario 2: total cut. In the worst scenario for the Cuban economy, we would lose the first supplier of fossil fuels, with even more devastating consequences for the Cuban economy.
None of the three scenarios is ideal. We are talking about an economy that, for years, has survived with an amount of fuel below the minimum it needs to operate normally. Therefore, the critical thing about the situation is that Cuba cannot afford to do without one more drop of oil.
And what about other providers? Although not impossible, it does not seem likely that Mexico, Russia and other countries currently supplying fossil fuels to Cuba will compensate for the partial or total loss from Venezuela.
The Mexican president confirmed that his country will maintain the flows in the current situation, but without further increases. For its part, Putin’s reaction It occurred last week in a meeting with ambassadors where he said that “(…) we have always provided and continue to provide assistance to our Cuban friends,” but this is more of a diplomatic statement than a confirmation of an increase in Russian aid.
Is there room to negotiate with new suppliers? The Cuban Government is probably evaluating efforts, but the problem is the shortage of foreign currency.
Cuba does not have enough foreign currency income to cover not only the needs of electricity generation, but also basic food, medicine or public transportation. Beyond the US blockade, which effectively closes markets and scares away investors, the country cannot enter dollars.
We all hope for the best for our country. However, as José Martí wrote in September 1893: “The whole art of saving is in foreseeing.” It is totally rational—and responsible—to plan for the worst-case scenario. The Government has the official numbers on the precise scope of each of the projections, which in all cases increase the complexity of the current situation.
Exposed wounds of the Cuban economy
Without a doubt, the current crisis in Venezuela and its consequences leave us clear lessons about how the Cuban economy works in the energy field and its relations with the rest of the world:
- The dependence on fossil fuels is very high. Cuba is 91% dependent on oil and other fossil fuels to generate electricity, evidencing the critical need for high and sustained flows. By requiring the import of two thirds of national demand, energy relations with foreign countries are strategic.
- Crude oil imports are relatively diversified. Unlike the almost total dependence on the Soviet Union before its disintegration, oil demand rests on several international suppliers. A partial or total cutoff of Venezuela does not mean the closure of all flows from abroad, although it does mean the most important one. The problem is that this “relative diversification” does not satisfy the current minimum needs of society and the economy. The solution would be to: 1) increase national crude oil production, 2) increase shipments from current partners, 3) look for new partners or 4) advance in the energy transition. All four solutions require significant amounts of foreign currency to be available.
- The solar panel strategy is correct, but still insufficient. Investment in renewable energy sources is a strategic bet. He 37% of investments In the state sector it is dedicated to the supply of electricity, gas and water, resulting in the installation of 37 solar parks in a year. It is a commendable effort, but the reality is that the blackouts during 2025 were worse: not because the panels are ineffective, but because what they generate does not compensate for the growing deficit in fossil fuels. Renewable energies cover 9% of the current energy matrix. Cuba plans to raise that proportion to 24% in four years, so dependence on crude oil will be a structural problem for a couple more decades.
- The dormant reform has made us more vulnerable. The postponement of structural changes in state companies, productivity, acceleration of foreign investment, the exchange market and better rules for the private sector has led to constant deteriorations in economic activity, making us more vulnerable to external shocks.
- The American economic war is at its peak. As in the worst moment in the nineties, when the Helms-Burton Act was signed, now from Washington there is a deliberate and public intention to strangle the Cuban economy and provoke the expected regime change.
In conclusion, the crisis in Venezuela touches us closely. The combination of high dependence on imported fossil fuels, severe foreign exchange restrictions and an economic reform postponed for more than fifteen years has reduced our ability to maneuver to a minimum. Betting only on changing the international context—whether in Washington or Caracas—is not a good strategy. The extraordinarily urgent nature of the situation demands extraordinary audacity.
