It is not simply a question of budgetary insufficiency or lack of technological resources, although both factors exist.
The fundamental problem is structural: Mexican prosecutors’ offices have been colonized by political dynamics that transform them into appendages of the executive branch in power, compromising their technical autonomy and independent investigative capacity.
On the ground, this translates into research priorities that respond to the agendas of the political moment rather than criminology or empirical evidence.
A paradigmatic case: while intentional homicides add up to tens of thousands annually, resources are concentrated on investigations with low criminal impact or are dedicated to pursuing political rivals of the executive.
The heads of the Attorney General’s Offices of the Republic and state Prosecutor’s Offices move like pieces of a political chess, where their permanence depends not on their institutional performance but on their loyalty to presidential interests. When administrations change, the owners also change; When they lose political usefulness, they are reassigned to other portfolios without anyone questioning the abandonment of critical investigations.
Political capture: roots and consequences
How did the prosecutors get to this state? The answer requires looking at the constitutional and administrative architecture. The 2008 criminal justice reform sought to modernize the system, but left a critical vulnerability: the appointment of prosecutors remains subordinated to political balances. Although the constitutions formally establish appointment procedures that include selection commissions, the reality is that the governors and the president in office continue to have effective veto power.
“Technically suitable” candidates are also usually politically acceptable to the executive branches.
This capture has concrete consequences. Corruption investigations against officials of allied governments are paralyzed indefinitely. Prosecutors specialized in organized crime lack horizontal and vertical coordination: they do not dialogue with each other, replicate efforts or, worse still, compete for jurisdictions. Prosecutors who could develop expertise in high-impact crimes are transferred to less administrative or politically sensitive areas. Operations against cartels are canceled when they involve political collaborators of the executive. All this while criminals observe and adjust their operations according to the electoral cycles.
Institutional shielding: paths towards autonomy
Resolving this crisis requires that Mexican governments resist the historic temptation to use prosecutors’ offices as instruments of political control. Specifically, it is necessary to introduce concrete institutional changes.
Firstthe state and federal constitutions must establish fixed eight-year terms for attorneys general, without reelection but also without discretionary removal. The mandate must be long enough to build a professional career, but structured enough to avoid co-option. Removal can only occur by independent commissions with representation from academia, professional lawyers and civil society, never by unilateral political decision.
Seconda truly meritocratic selection system must be created. Before nominalist commissions, open public competitions are required where external candidates compete with career officials. Evaluation criteria should be published, processes audited by independent observers, and results thoroughly documented. This reduces the room for political manipulation and raises the average quality of candidates.
Thirdprosecutors need budgetary independence. Currently, budgets are approved through legislatures where the executive has preponderant influence. An autonomous fund, fed by specific tax revenues and immunized against annual discretionary decisions, would allow prosecutors’ offices to plan long-term operations without subjecting themselves to budget blackmail each legislative cycle.
Professionalization and permanence: construction of an institutional career
The second set of reforms must attack destructive staff turnover. Today, changes in administration generate massive exoduses in the prosecutor’s offices. Investigators trained for years migrate to private offices, international security agencies or simply leave public administration. This destroys institutional memory and condemns new teams to start from scratch.
The solution requires attractive long-term careers. Salaries competitive with the private labor market, decent retirement systems, incentives for seniority and specialization, and job stability for basic researchers (detached from political-administrative changes) are essential. Attorney general and states can change; Investigators specialized in drugs, homicides and corruption must remain, transfer knowledge and train successors.
At the same time, continuous training must be protected. Mexican prosecutors’ offices with permanent training centers, agreements with universities, international exchanges and professional certifications in specialized areas would create technically superior teams and less vulnerable to political manipulation. An investigator with verifiable expertise and professional recognition is more difficult to capture than one dependent on administrative favors.
Are these institutions viable?
The uncomfortable question remains: can such deeply contaminated institutions be reformed from within?
The answer is yes, but with conditions.
It requires governments genuinely committed to combating crime above electoral interests. It requires legislatures that curb executive impulses. It requires vigilant civil society. It is not likely to happen due to political generosity, but it is possible if presidents and governors understand that dysfunctional prosecutors do not effectively pursue political enemies or control crime.
