The regime waged war on the “Representative Rate of the Informal Market in Cuba” prepared by ‘elToque’ and is now trying to supplant it.
MIAMI, United States. – The Cuban regime announced this Wednesday the launch, starting this Thursday, of a third segment of the exchange market with a floating exchange rate that will be published daily by the Central Bank of Cuba (BCC). The measure was presented on national television by the Minister President of the National Bank of Cuba, Juana Lilia Delgado Portal, as the central axis of a “gradual transformation” of the exchange system, with the declared objective of attracting foreign currency to the official circuit and reducing the pressure of the informal market, today the main real reference of the value of the Cuban peso.
During his appearance, Delgado Portal confirmed that the new scheme will coexist with two fixed rates already in force—one of 1×24 and another of 1×120—and that the third segment will operate with a daily floating rate, determined by supply and demand and disseminated by the BCC “in its capacity as the country’s monetary authority.” As he explained, the decision “is based on the objective existence of differences between the official exchange rates and the real value that reflects the shortage of foreign currency.”
The official stressed that the new segment seeks to offer an incentive for exporters and other economic actors to sell foreign currency to the state banking system and added that the purpose is “to encourage the entry of foreign currency into the exchange market, which will constitute a source for their operations and reduce the pressures and irregularities of the informal market.”
Delgado Portal ruled out an immediate unification of exchange rates, warning that a measure of this type “could cause a sudden devaluation with inflationary effects greater than the current ones and deepening the loss of purchasing power of the national currency against foreign currencies.” Instead, he defended a transitory scheme of multiple segments, which, he said, would allow “gradually correcting distortions without severe macroeconomic shocks,” appealing to “international experience” in economies with accumulated exchange imbalances.
The regime ensures that the first two segments, with fixed rates, will be maintained “in such a way that sudden devaluations do not occur,” with the argument of protecting “the population in basic and sensitive operations” and preserving price stability in essential goods and services. However, the very admission of a third floating segment implies the official recognition that the current rates do not reflect the real value of the Cuban peso, a fact that for years has been evidenced by the informal market and documented by independent observatories.
The appearance also included direct references to strengthening accounts in freely convertible currency (MLC). Delgado Portal stated that work will be done on their “stabilization and progressive strengthening,” and denied that there is any intention to dismantle them. “The objective is clear, to strengthen the purchasing capacity of the MLC and its use value,” he said. Likewise, he announced that the operation of foreign currency bank accounts of non-state forms of management will be guaranteed, which would allow them to carry out internal and foreign trade transactions.
The legal provisions that support these transformations, the official said, will be published in the Official Gazette of the Republic and will come into effect this Thursday, December 18. From that date on, the Central Bank will publish exchange rates daily on its official website.
The announcement occurs in a context marked by the regime’s offensive against the informal currency market and against the independent media. theTouchwhose representative rate of the dollar and the euro had become the main reference for the population and for numerous economic actors. In recent weeks, authorities and official media have repeatedly accused theTouch of “manipulation” and “speculation”, while the Ministry of the Interior has reported police operations and criminal proceedings linked to the informal sale and purchase of foreign currency, without there being a functional official market capable of absorbing that demand.
Paradoxically, the explicit recognition of a third floating segment confirms a good part of the diagnosis that the regime has tried to discredit: the existence of a deep gap between official rates and the real value of currencies in Cuba. The difference now is that the Government is trying to channel that reality through a mechanism controlled by the State, with the expectation of capturing foreign currency and recovering banking and fiscal traceability.
