The gravity is not in what El Güero did, but in who allowed it.
The architect of a massive criminal operation
Joaquín Guzmán López was not a minor operator, but very discreet and low-profile. He was part of “Los Chapitos”, supervising methamphetamine laboratories, coordinating the import of chemical precursors and managing distribution throughout Sinaloa. It was identified by the US Treasury as responsible for a significant proportion of the illicit fentanyl crossing the border.
Court documents indicate that Los Chapitos generated more than 10 million annually. That cannot be achieved without massive infrastructure and, crucially, without institutional protection. At just 22 years old he was recruited to assume high operational responsibilities. His previous confession to the court, where he answered “drug dealer” as his occupation, reflected reality: for more than a decade he operated under a system that not only allowed it, but facilitated it.
The verdict as a symptom of structural corruption
The guilty plea should be interpreted for what it really is: an indictment against the architecture of corruption that kept El Güero operating.
El Mayó Zambada, historical co-founder of the cartel, acknowledged under oath that “we encouraged corruption by paying police officers, military commanders and politicians who allowed us to operate freely.”
They were not occasional bribes.
It was a system where corruption was not the problem, but the rule. If El Mayo paid officials for 56 years under six different presidents, why would El Güero have been an exception? American courts now have affidavits. They have collaborators. Washington has irrefutable documentation of what Mexico prefers not to examine.
Panic in the palaces, who should be worried?
Here is the uncomfortable question: How many politicians, soldiers and police officers who received money from Guzmán López will see their names in documents presented before US courts?
Joaquín’s agreement includes broad cooperation.
US prosecutors await revelations about the full architecture of corruption. That means names, dates, specific transactions. His brother Ovidio is already cooperating. His uncles have been transferred under US protection.
The criminal cooperation machine is in motion.
For governors who allowed operations, there is exposure to money laundering. For military and police who provided intelligence, risk of conspiracy. For politicians with cartel financing, exposure to money laundering and illegal financing. The critical factor: Joaquín Guzmán López is alive. You can testify. He can be interrogated under US procedure.
The scariest question is simple: Are there communications about me? Are there transactions recorded under my name? Are there witnesses documenting my encounters with cartel operators?
The message of distrust: why doesn’t Washington believe in Mexico?
When two of El Chapo’s sons plead guilty in US courts, when El Mayo is captured in the United States, when the entire persecution infrastructure passes into US hands, we witness unprecedented institutional distrust.
Washington is not being aggressive. He’s being realistic.
Historical experience justifies it: Mexico has demonstrated the inability to prosecute drug lords without interference from corruption. That’s not diplomatic interference.
It is a national security strategy based on documented realities.
