In order not to play the game of the unwary, those who receive news of public interest had to check “their sources.”
PUERTO PADRE, Cuba. – All schools of research and operational management in the world, without distinction of ideologies, agree on one axiom: “Operational work is an art and without histrionic aptitudes, operational activity is useless.”
In simpler terms: the first scene of the prevention and termination of a crime or of the criminal sanction, of prison or death as a penalty, is in the pretense and in making what is technique and plans appear to be coincidence.
And since operational officers, their agents, and even unrecruited informants, everyone from a three-star general to a neighborhood snitch, employ theatrical techniques to establish or advance their positions.
I say this because in a case tried behind closed doors against the former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Planning Alejandro Gil Fernández, accused of espionage and nine other crimes, and in which all, absolutely all the powers of the State have maintained an impenetrable silence, it turns out that a relative of Alejandro Gil, who confessed to having been an agent of an operational body on a mission to preserve fine arts, said that he has a “source” who has leaked information about the process, such serious revelations as the that would involve the former vice prime minister as an alleged CIA agent, a question that after so much institutional secrecy leads one to ask: Is it not information infiltration instead of leak?
TRUE. Just the fact that this person familiar with Alejandro Gil has been a former agent of an operational body, as she herself says, brings her closer to officers or former officers of the Ministry of the Interior in possession of classified information or with the possibility of accessing secret information. And I say more and this example is enough: Colonel Quero, a very damaged officer of the former General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI) who already in 1964 carried the secret threads of what would later be the campaigns of the Cuban regime in Africa, in the 70s, was an assistant to Piñeiro Barbarroja, who subordinated only to Fidel Castro and in command of the America Department, seeded Central and South America with guerrillas and agents of penetration or influence. (When I say that Barbarossa and his people “sowed” those countries, it is not a metaphor: Daniel Ortega is still there in Nicaragua to remind us).
Once that campaign was over, in the early 80s and already at the end of his career, Quero was something like a police attaché in the Ministry of Culture. Among other missions, he had in his hands, together with officials from the Technical Directorate of Investigations (DTI), the skein of the “Oil Case” – that is what they called the investigation into the theft, if I remember correctly – of eight famous paintings by Wifredo Lam.
With this background, it is perfectly possible that someone who was an agent or a simple informant for the preservation of works of art in the Ministry of Culture, still has relations with officials of the Ministry of the Interior. Now, it is worth asking: How many of those once young officers who one day were alongside old Colonel Quero, today would be willing to become spies, to “leak” information about a criminal process followed by espionage?
This smells like dictated from Havana. And in order not to play the game of those who are gullible, those who receive news of public interest had to check “their sources” and “cross-check the information” according to the style of the spy handlers, themselves so given to the accusation of espionage.
