HAVANA, Cuba. – It seems that things are serious. That about creating nuclei of the Communist Party and the UJC Within the MSMEs it was not only a “suggestion”, a joke in bad taste to multiply the terror by 12 – in the midst of the package against those private businesses that bother the regime – but it has been converted into a first-order task , in “revolutionary offensive.” More than one mipymero has already had a knock on the door to ask him how many militants there are hired or how many of the employees he believes have “qualities” to begin the “growth” process, if they are enough to create a “base committee” or if there is one. the possibility of joining one that already exists in the area.
On the matter, I have received several testimonies from people close to me, those who, having been “combative” communist militants in the recent past, have now become businesswomen “who care nothing about politics because their thing is to make money.”
Of private businessmen who, regardless of how “apolitical” they have become after the “every man for himself” of the Ordering Taskthey have imposed deadlines and quotas so that they can begin this new “experiment” that, without a doubt, would not only seek to reproduce in the private sector the same mediocre and ideologizing boredom that corrodes the state sector from within but, through the premise that the Party “guides” those who “lead”, plans to take control of each of the businesses to the detriment of the will of some “owners” who would immediately become subordinate to the political organization.
There is no exaggeration in what I say, because there is no naivety or improvisation in the objectives of that “genius” who “occurred” to inoculate the germ of inefficiency, unproductivity, unprofitability, of zero creativity, of inertia. and the apathy in a “private” sector that, with the defects and errors that undoubtedly tarnish it, has demonstrated to possess all the great virtues that the state sector completely lacks, precisely because in this everything, even production, is subordinated to political-ideological control.
Just as happens in each of the government and management structures of the regime, in accordance with the design of its “creators” for whom it is very clear that in Cuba only those who claim to limit themselves to “guidance” direct in concrete terms.
Thus, for example, a Party activist in a company, if he sets his mind to it and knows how to do it, could remove a manager from his position or veto a decision made by him. Likewise, at the territorial level, a Party secretary is more important than a governor, just as, at the country level, the first secretary of the PCC, if not in the hands of the same person, would be above the president, although always below any of the so-called “historical figures”, that is, those generals and commanders who, even without holding political or leadership positions, will always have the last word, even if this opposes the most intelligent decision and leads to committing one or the other perhaps the same “mistakes” (just as is happening right now with MSMEs).
For that reason alone, and not because of a question of “procedures” and “regulations,” during his first months as president, Miguel Diaz-Canel did not inherit the PCC secretariat that Raúl Castro retained for the necessary time perhaps to make sure that, although by chance, he had made a “good choice”, to leave a public heir (just that) who, although today he holds both powers, It is very clear that above the Party, the Council of State, and the Council of Ministers, the National Assembly and even the Pipisigallo, there is a “council of elders”, a military leadership and, above all, a surname.
From that perspective it is much easier to foresee what the consequences of the “experiment” would be, from which only those businesses that have previously been “marked” to explode from within will come out badly, so that the “plan of attack” is revealed as an implosion, the result of a confrontation between owners and employees (“militant” employees) and not a witch hunt.
We can now visualize the possible scenarios, in the same style as the scenarios we know in state companies, where the common thing is not that the militants make the manager “exploit” for being corrupt or a “bad leader” but rather that they collude and do a lot. more tangled, longer, denser and deeper is that core of corruption and immorality that not infrequently coincides with partisan cores.
And all of us who have ever worked “for the State” know that generally to fix a company, an institution, a ministry it would only be enough to eliminate the political and mass organizations that parasitize them. But there is no easy way to do it, no one is allowed to even try because the controlling essence of the system is, in addition, parasitic – which could even be synonymous with “partisan” – and first they would be willing to disappear a company, no matter how efficient. and productive that it is, rather than putting at risk the core that controls it politically.
That, the worst scenario, will happen only with the MSMEs that bother them even though in “banking” and “discipline”, in “honesty” and “good performance” obtain scores of 120 out of 100. If they manage to survive inspectors and auditors, police and prosecutors, they may not do so when the time bomb explodes inside them.
