The streets, the last option

On several occasions we had emphasized that, when political problems, and their solutions, do not flow and are not processed through institutional channels, politics moves to the streets.

The streets, then, take a leading role, since politics is defined in the streets. In this scenario, according to the resources of force and violence, solutions and solutions are imposed.

That happened, for example, in October and November 2019. It was the protest in the streets that left former President Morales cornered, who, as if in a dead end, must abruptly leave power. I consider, by the way, not very rational those versions that ignore the force of the streets and maintain that it was a “coup d’état.” With the apologies of the case, these versions are loaded with enormous stupidity and enormous fanaticism.

Now, in the current circumstances, taking into account that he no longer has other alternatives to enable his candidacy, Morales and company decide that option, since it is the last thing they have left. Fight and impose the candidacy in the streets, through marches, blockades and social upheaval.

In that order, they planned and decided on the “march to save Bolivia,” as the “mother of battles.” With poor reading, they bet on their success. This had to achieve the resignation of the first and second president, so that the third, Andrónico Rodríguez, assumes the presidency, in constitutional succession, empowers Morales and calls for elections. That was the initial political calculation. The march was, “now or never.” This is what the former government minister, ideologue and strategist, Juan Ramon de la Quintana, expressed in full swing.

The march, in that sense, as it progressed, had to add more people and more civil society groups, apart from the participation of the coca growers, of the six federations of the tropics, whose presence was noted in a large percentage. Perhaps, somewhat dazed, the strategists calculated, in the end, one million marchers. They were sure that they could condense in their favor the great discontent that exists today against the government due to the escalation of inflation, the fuel shortage and the dramatic lack of dollars. The objective was to take advantage of the great discontent and massify the march.

However, beyond the great discontent, the situation is different. That, so basic, the strategists did not know how to read. The march, in its path, added nothing. He was only able to reach La Paz, with 15,000 marchers (Morales’ number), far from the estimated million. The planned entry by the leadership of the “People’s General Staff”, from the four cardinal points, with their “shock groups” at the vanguard, was aborted, precisely, due to the weak presence and participation. Those 15,000 marchers had to endure the total and absolute indifference of the city of El Alto and La Paz. Nobody supported them. To the point that, after the abrupt end of the rally, without shock groups to protect them and abandoned by their leader, they had to flee quickly in terror.

Now, there is something that draws our attention. The entry of the marchers into El Alto and La Paz occurred without any resistance or violence, as was eventually foreseen, based on the threats from both blocks. Despite the threatening tone of President Arce’s first message, warning Morales that he would “enforce the Constitution”; The entry was peaceful. Nobody attacked them, nor tried to interrupt their march. The followers of the “arcist” bloc and officials who were waiting for them suddenly retreat. How is this interpreted? Of course, there was a change in strategy. They let them enter in peace so as not to fall into the terrain of violence, a scenario that the march certainly intended. In scenes of violence, and deaths involved, Morales usually reaches the “crest of the wave.” However, they did not give him the opportunity. In that sense, it was a double failure.

After having worn out the march, as an instrument of political pressure, since it will be extremely difficult for him to organize another one, what is left for him in this scenario of his struggle transferred to the streets?

The blockade still remains. And, if possible, in the blockade, the seizure. Although they have suspended the “general road blockade,” which was to begin this Monday, September 30, it will be difficult for them to abandon that last option they have. Now of course, if the political decision is carried out, the blockades would have to be forceful, that is, throughout the country. Otherwise, if they fail with the blockades, as they failed in the march, the sunset would be near.

The great challenge, in that scenario, is Arce Catacora. Challenge, in terms of enforcing the Constitution, avoiding blockades, avoiding convulsion and arresting Morales, for flagrant crimes of sedition. For the same crimes that Fernando Camacho and Jeanine Áñez are accused of. It’s in your hands. A pusillanimous attitude would make him even less likely to be a potential candidate.

However, if he manages to defeat Morales, he would suddenly regain that potential character of a candidate. For many, he would catapult himself as a good candidate, for having saved Bolivia from Morales.